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This paper examines the impacts of banking market structure and regulation on economic growth using 
new data on banking market concentration and manufacturing industry-level growth rates for U.S. states 
during  1899-1929—a period when the manufacturing sector was expanding rapidly and restrictive 
branching laws segmented the U.S. banking system geographically. Unlike studies of developing and 
developed countries today, we find that banking market concentration generally had a positive impact on 
manufacturing sector growth in the early twentieth century United States, with a somewhat stronger 
impact on industries with smaller establishments, lower rates of incorporation, and less reliance on bond 
markets (and, hence, relatively more reliance on banks). Because regulations affecting bank entry varied 
considerably across states and the industrial organization of the U.S. banking system differs markedly 
from those of other countries, we consider the impact of other aspects of banking market structure and 
policy on growth. Even after controlling for differences in the prevalence of branch banking, deposit 
insurance, and other aspects of policy and market structure, we find that market concentration boosted 
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Does the Structure of Banking Markets Affect Economic Growth? 
Evidence from U.S. State Banking Markets 
I. Introduction
A long line of scholarship posits a causal relationship between finance and economic 
growth. According to this view, well-developed capital markets—especially those imbued with 
rights that protect investors—promote the efficient allocation of funds to projects with high rates 
of return, in turn stimulating savings, investment, and economic growth.
1 Evidence from both 
single-country and cross-country studies suggests that economies with more developed financial 
markets begin to grow earlier, attain higher growth rates, and achieve higher levels of per capita 
income than economies with less developed financial markets.
2
Many empirical studies have followed Rajan and Zingales (1998) in exploiting 
differences across space and time to identify a causal link between finance and development, and 
recent research has focused on the mechanisms underlying that relationship. The present paper 
contributes to a growing body of literature that examines how banking institutions affect 
economic activity. Financial intermediaries are thought to improve resource allocation and fund 
projects with higher rates of return by matching borrowers and lenders efficiently and by 
monitoring firm behavior (Allen, 1990; Boyd and Prescott, 1986; Greenwood and Jovanovic, 
1990; Kashyap et al., 2002; King and Levine, 1993b). Researchers have found considerable 
evidence that banking system structure and competition affect economic growth. For example, 
based on a cross-section sample of 41 countries for 1980-90, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find 
that increased concentration in banking markets depresses industrial growth in general, but 
 These findings have prompted 
researchers to consider more carefully how financial markets affect economic activity in the long 
run. For example, in an important paper that exploits cross-country and cross-industry 
differences, Rajan and Zingales (1998) conclude that financial development helps firms 
surmount moral hazard and adverse selection problems and thereby reduces the costs of external 
finance. 
                                                 
1 Recent examples of this literature include Beck et al. (2000), Bekaert et al. (2005), King and Levine (1993a, b), 
Levine and Zervos (1998), and Rajan and Zingales (1998). La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) discuss the importance of 
legal traditions influencing financial development.  
2 For surveys of this literature, see Levine (1997, 2006) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (2001). For a within-
country example, see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2004). 2 
 
boosts the growth of industries that depend relatively heavily on external sources of finance. 
Similarly, based on data for regional banking markets in Italy, Bonaccorsi di Patti and 
Dell’Ariccia (2004) find that higher concentration promotes firm creation in industries where the 
creditworthiness of entrepreneurs is difficult to assess.
3  By contrast, Claessens and Laeven 
(2005) find that more competition in banking markets raises the growth of industries that depend 
relatively heavily on external financing, though Hoxha (2009) reaches the opposite conclusion 
using a somewhat different model and dataset.
4
With a few exceptions, most empirical studies of the impact of banking market structure 
or competition on economic activity assume that each country consists of a single national 
banking market. That assumption might be tenable for banking systems that are dominated by a 
few large banks with nationwide branch networks. However, the banking systems of countries 
with a tradition of unit banking, such as the United States, consist of more geographically 
segmented banking markets. Long-standing legal restrictions on both interstate branching and 
branching within the borders of most states left the United States with highly fragmented local 
banking markets that only recently have become well integrated. Although most legal barriers to 
branching within and across state lines were eliminated in the 1990s, the concentration of 
deposits among banks in the United States remains low compared with most other countries.
  
5 
Because of the unusual structure of the U.S. banking system, the findings of studies that examine 
the impact of banking market structure on economic development using countries as the unit of 
observation might not reflect the U.S. experience.
6
To determine whether the findings of cross-country studies generalize to a geographically 
segmented banking environment, the present paper investigates the impact of banking 
  
                                                 
3 Bonaccorsi di Patti and Dell’Ariccia (2004) also find that higher concentration raises the rate of entrepreneurship 
across all industries when banking markets are relatively unconcentrated ex ante, but reduces the overall rate of firm 
creation when banking markets are already highly concentrated. Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), however, find that the 
number of firms is larger and average firm size is smaller in less concentrated local U.S. banking markets.   
4  Claessens and Laeven (2005) focus on the effects of banking market competition, which they estimate using data 
for individual banks, whereas Hoxha (2009) includes measures of both competition and concentration.  
Following Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), we focus here on the effects of concentration, in part because the bank-
level data required to calculate alternative measures of competition are not available for U.S. banks in the early 
twentieth century. 
5 The average three- and five-bank concentration ratios for the United States during 1989-96 were 0.15 and 0.20, 
respectively. Three-bank ratios for other countries ranged between 0.21 (Japan) and 0.87 (Jordan), and five-bank 
ratios ranged between 0.32 (Japan) and 0.99 (New Zealand) (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001, Table 1). 
6 In addition to Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), other studies that use countries as the unit of observation to examine 
the effects of banking market competition and structure include Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004), Claessens and 
Laeven (2004; 2005), and Demirgüç-Kunt, Laeven, and Levine (2004). 3 
 
concentration on the growth of manufacturing industries across U.S. states during the first three 
decades of the twentieth century—a period when firms relied heavily on bank financing and U.S. 
banking markets were geographically segmented by restrictive branching laws. Because the 
structure of the U.S. banking system today is evolving rapidly in response to the removal of most 
branching restrictions, as well as because of the recent financial crisis and recession, we focus on 
a period when interstate branching was prohibited and many states restricted branching within 
their borders. Further, in our investigation of the effects of banking concentration on growth, we 
control explicitly for differences in state banking policies and other aspects of market structure 
that may have affected the growth of manufacturing industries. It might be possible to carry out a 
similar exercise by examining bank regulations in developing countries today; however, the best 
available database on bank regulation is not retrospective in nature (Barth, Caprio, and Levine, 
2001).  
Even if one gathered historical information on bank regulation across developing 
countries, unobserved heterogeneity is more likely to be a concern in a cross-country study of 
developed and developing countries than in a study of U.S. states. Because banking institutions 
and regulations differ considerably across countries, there is considerable scope for omitted 
variables to be problematic in cross-country empirical studies, providing an additional reason 
why the within-country setting (where such differences can be explicitly accounted for) may 
shed additional light on these questions. By contrast, U.S. states, particularly in the era before the 
removal of federal restrictions on interstate branching, represent a fertile environment for 
studying the relationship among bank regulations, market structure, and economic growth. For 
example, many studies have found that branching and interstate banking deregulation affected 
rates of economic growth and entrepreneurship, as well as aspects of industrial structure across 
U.S. states in the 1980s and 1990s.
7
Our study exploits variation in growth rates of individual manufacturing industries across 
U.S. states, as well as differences in the structure and regulation of state banking systems, to 
 We investigate whether differences in the prevalence of 
branching and in other aspects of bank regulation and market structure affected the growth of 
manufacturing industries during the first three decades of the twentieth century. 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Black and Strahan (2002), Cetorelli and Strahan (2006), Freeman 
(2002) and Garrett, Wagner and Wheelock (2007). The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 
permitted interstate branching beginning in 1997. Before then, state laws determined the extent to which banks 
could branch within states. Several states eased restrictions on branching between 1900 and 1929 (see White, 1983). 
A second deregulation wave occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. 4 
 
provide new evidence on the effects of banking market structure and regulation on U.S. 
manufacturing growth in the early twentieth century. Our approach follows Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and other cross-country studies of economic growth in 
recent periods in exploring how banking market structure affected growth across industries that 
differ in terms of technology or reliance on external funding sources.
8
Our within-country finding that banking market concentration generally had a positive 
effect on growth of manufacturing industries for the United States contrasts with evidence from 
cross-country studies which find that concentration tends to retard growth (Cetorelli and 
Gambera, 2001). The unique structure and regulation of U.S. banking historically may explain 
this difference and, hence, we explore the impacts of other aspects of banking market structure 
and regulation on industrial growth. For example, we find that more banks per capita and branch 
banking increased growth rates among industries that relied relatively heavily on external 
financing, and that state deposit insurance systems depressed growth  of manufacturing 
 We find that concentration 
in state banking systems generally had a positive impact on the growth of U.S. manufacturing 
industries. Our results are robust to controlling for various bank regulations and other market 
characteristics. Further, we find some evidence that the impact of concentration varied across 
industries with different degrees of reliance on external financing. In particular, we find evidence 
that banking market concentration had a smaller impact on the growth of industries with larger 
average size establishments, higher percentages of incorporated firms, or that relied more heavily 
on capital markets (as opposed to banks) for external financing, though the evidence for these 
differential effects is less robust to specification and model than the overall positive effect of 
concentration on the growth of manufacturing. These results suggest that firms that depended 
more on banks than on capital markets for external finance benefited more from concentration of 
banking markets. Our results are thus consistent with the view that market power encourages 
banks to invest in information and monitoring technologies that increase lending to small 
businesses and other firms for which information problems are especially acute (e.g., Petersen 
and Rajan, 1995). 
                                                 
8 By contrast, most previous studies consider the effects of state banking policies only on aggregate growth rates. 
For example, Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2007) examine the impact of branch banking and deposit insurance on 
economic performance at the state level during 1900-40. They find that branching had an unambiguously positive 
effect on bank loan growth, output of the agricultural and manufacturing sectors, and on educational attainment, 
whereas deposit insurance had mixed effects. 5 
 
industries. These findings also appear robust to alternative measures of industry growth as well 
as different measures of reliance on external financing. 
II. Firm Finance and Unit Banking 
The development of deep and liquid debt and equity markets is often cited as a key 
institutional innovation that encouraged the efficient allocation of financial capital to investment 
projects and in turn spurred high rates of economic growth in the United States (Goldsmith, 
1969; Gurley and Shaw, 1955; Rousseau and Sylla, 2005; Rousseau and Wachtel, 1998; Wachtel 
and Rousseau, 1995). Indeed, recent empirical scholarship relies on this fact and uses the United 
States as a benchmark to assess the development of financial systems in other countries 
(Cetorelli and Gambera, 2001; Masten, et al. 2008; Rajan and Zingales, 1998; Raddatz, 2006). 
However, the widespread use of capital markets by U.S. business enterprises emerged 
gradually. Circa 1900, the market for long-term business credit was limited in scale and scope. 
Whereas railroads and telegraph companies had long issued bonds, electric utilities and firms 
engaged in manufacturing or trade were just beginning to make use of debt and equity markets. 
Moreover, only the largest enterprises tapped capital markets; most others relied on renewable 
short-term funds provided by banks or trade credit—even to finance longer-term investment 
(Jacoby and Saulnier, 1947). Consequently, as of 1900, commercial banks held two-thirds of the 
assets of all financial intermediaries (White, 1997, p. 85). 
In the United States, bank charters are issued by both the federal government and state 
governments. Federally chartered (i.e., “national”) banks are subject to federal regulation and 
supervision, whereas state-chartered banks are subject to state-based regulations and 
supervision.
9 At the beginning of the twentieth century, federal banking laws prohibited national 
banks from operating branch offices. Similarly, the laws and practices of most states prohibited 
branching by state-chartered banks. As a result, the U.S. banking system consisted of thousands 
of small unit banks. In 1900, the United States had 12,427 commercial banks, of which 3,731 
held federal charters and 8,696 held state charters. Only 87 banks operated any branches, and 
most of those had only one branch office. The average national bank had $1.3 million of total 
assets, whereas the average state bank had a mere $0.5 million.
10
                                                 
9 State-chartered banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System are subject to supervision by both the 
Federal Reserve and state banking authorities. 
  By contrast, the banking 
10 Data on the number and total assets of banks are from Board of Governors (1959). Data on the number of banks 
with branch offices and the number of branches are from Board of Governors (1943, p. 297). 6 
 
systems of most other early industrializing nations were dominated by a few large banks with 
extensive nationwide branch networks.
11
Federal and state banking regulations began to change during the first decades of the 
twentieth century. The Gold Standard Act of 1900 lowered capital requirements for national 
banks, which prompted several states to lower requirements for state-chartered banks. Several 
states also established deposit insurance systems or eased restrictions on branching during this 
period. The federal government responded by allowing national banks limited freedom to operate 
branch offices in states that permitted branching by state banks.
  
12
III. Evidence on the Effects of Banking Market Concentration on Growth 
 By 1929, 751 banks, including 
167 national banks, operated a total of 3,522 branches, although unit banking continued to 
prevail in many states. Federal banking regulations applied nearly uniformly to national banks in 
all states, but differences in state banking regulations and supervisory systems caused state 
banking markets to vary widely in terms of entry opportunities and thus competitive 
environment. Differences across states in branching laws, capital requirements, state deposit 
insurance systems, and other banking market characteristics make the United States a 
particularly interesting laboratory for understanding how banking market structure and policy 
affect economic growth. Importantly, however, individual states changed their regulatory 
systems during our sample period, and it is the changes within states that we exploit to gain 
identification in our empirical exercises.  
Standard theories of industrial organization suggest that deviations from perfect 
competition introduce inefficiencies which, in turn, can limit firms’ access to funds and thus 
hinder economic growth. On the other hand, recent research suggests that market power might 
facilitate firms’ access to credit by giving banks an incentive to establish long-term relationships 
with borrowers (Mayer, 1988; Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Further, Marquez (2002) argues that 
banks are less capable of screening potential borrowers in competitive banking markets, which 
                                                 
11 The number of banks per capita and average size of banks illustrate the unusual structure of the U.S. banking 
system. As of 1902, the United States had some 18 banks per 100,000 persons, whereas Canada, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom had 0.51, 0.22, and 0.18 banks per 100,000 persons, respectively (Grossman, 2010, Table 3.3). As 
of 1930, U.S. banks held an average of $2.63 million of deposits, whereas banks in Canada, Germany, and the 
United Kingdom held an average of $225.67 million, $8.27 million, and $601.26 million, respectively (Grossman, 
2010, Table 3.4). 
12 The McFadden Act of 1927 permitted national banks to operate branches in states where state-chartered banks 
were allowed to branch. However, national banks were not permitted to participate in state deposit insurance 
systems. See White (1983) for information about the evolution of state and federal banking laws and practices 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century. 7 
 
increases lending to low-quality borrowers. This inefficiency can cause equilibrium interest rates 
to be higher in banking markets composed of many small banks than in markets dominated by a 
few large banks. Because theory yields ambiguous answers, the effect of banking market 
competition on economic growth is ultimately an empirical question. 
Our empirical strategy exploits state-level differences in growth rates across a variety of 
manufacturing industries to examine how banking market structure and regulation  influence 
economic growth in countries with geographically segmented banking markets. The U.S. 
manufacturing sector grew rapidly during the first decades of the twentieth century. The total 
real value added of the sector increased 2.5 times and real value added per worker increased by 
27 percent between 1899 and 1929.
13
We estimate the effects of bank concentration on the average annual growth rate in 
manufacturing industry i between t–1 and t (where t is a subscript for time) as follows: 
 For comparison with earlier studies such as Cetorelli and 
Gambera (2001), we first investigate the impact of banking market concentration on the growth 
of manufacturing in general and across industries with different degrees of reliance on or access 
to external financing. However, because concentration alone might not adequately reflect the 
competitive environment, especially in a unit banking system, we subsequently augment our 
regression models with various banking policies and other market characteristics that may have 
also affected competition in state banking markets and growth rates in the manufacturing sector. 
(1)  %∆Outputijt = α1 + α2Bank Concentrationjt−1  
+ α3Industry Share of Output in Manufacturingijt−1 
+ γj + λt + ξi + εijt,         
where j is a subscript for the state, ε is a white noise error term, and γ, λ., and ξ are fixed effects 
for year, state, and industry, respectively. State and industry fixed effects capture unobserved 
characteristics at the state and industry level that may influence output growth, and time fixed 
effects control for any unobserved influences operating at the state level. State fixed effects also 
enable us to account for factors, such as financial development, which have been included in 
cross-country studies and that may vary across polities.
14
                                                 
13  Nominal value added in manufacturing increased from $5.5 billion in 1899 to $30.6 billion in 1929 and 
employment rose from 5.5 million to 10.7 million. The growth in manufacturing value added was similar to the 
growth in total U.S. gross national product. See Historical Statistics of the United States (2000), Series Dd10 (value 
added), Ba834 (employment), and Ca214 (gross national product).  
 Our identification thus comes from 
examining within-state, within-industry changes. Values for banking market concentration are 
14  We included an interaction of industry and year fixed effects in an alternative specification and obtained 
qualitatively identical results to those reported in the paper. Results are available from the authors on request. 8 
 
from the beginning of the 10-year period over which we examine annualized growth rates of 
manufacturing output (e.g., we use observations on the bank concentration ratio for 1899 when 
considering manufacturing growth rates for 1899-1909). Since all the industries we consider are 
in manufacturing, Equation 1 also controls for an industry-specific convergence effect using the 
share of total manufacturing output accounted for by industry i in state j at the start of each 10-
year period over which we observe industry output. Following Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) and 
Rajan and Zingales (1998), we include this in order to capture an effect that is similar to 
including initial income per capita in standard growth regressions, except in this case it controls 
for an industry-specific, time-varying effect, whereby industries that have grown relatively 
rapidly in the past will likely grow slower in the future.  
Sample Manufacturing Industries 
We computed average annual state-level growth in real output for 18 industries, and the 
share of total state manufacturing output accounted for by each industry, using data on value of 
products from the 1899, 1909, 1919, and 1929 U.S. Census of Manufactures. The dependent 
variable for each regression is thus defined in a panel context as the annual average output 
growth rate between 1899-1909, 1909-1919, and 1919-1929.
15
The U.S. Census of Manufactures has not been digitized; hence, we hand-collected data 
for the 18 industries included in our study. In deciding which industries to include in our sample, 
we attempted to balance the cost of inputting industry-state-year data with obtaining a 
representative sample of industries. We included industries that constituted the largest share of 
U.S. manufacturing employment in either 1899 or 1929 so that our sample would capture the 
broad trends encompassing U.S. manufacturing during the first three decades of the twentieth 
century, i.e. we included industries that were once large but declining after 1900 as well as 
 We converted all nominal dollar 
amounts to inflation-adjusted values using a GNP deflator (Gordon, 2000). We end our study in 
1929 because of the significant changes in federal banking and securities regulation, government 
support for troubled banks, and innovations in bank lending and other sources of firm financing 
that occurred as a result of the Great Depression, all of which dramatically reshaped the banking 
environment. 
                                                 
15 We obtained qualitatively similar results using the annual average growth rate of real value added as the measure 
of growth. Results are available from the authors on request. 9 
 
industries that grew quickly after 1900 and had become large employers by 1929.
16
Our sample includes several established industries with high employment at the start of 
our period, such as cotton goods, lumber and timber products, and boots and shoes, but which 
subsequently grew slowly between 1899 and 1929. The sample also includes industries with 
relatively small employment shares in 1899 but then expanded rapidly over the subsequent three 
decades, such as electrical machinery and motor vehicles, which represent some of the “high-
tech” industries of the period. In addition, the sample includes some other historically important 
industries, such as iron and steel and railroad cars, that were part of the first wave of U.S. 
industrialization but may have had renewed importance with the expansion of industry in the 
early twentieth century. Table I reports average annual growth rates of inflation-adjusted output 
for each of the 18 industries in our sample at decade intervals and for 1899 to 1929 as a whole. 
As shown in the table, growth rates varied considerably at the national level across industries and 
over time. For example, from 1899 to 1909, the lumber industry grew at an annualized rate of 
2.45 percentage points whereas motor vehicle assembly grew at a rate of 37.87 percentage 
points. Over this period, growth rates differed considerably between industries, as reflected by a 
standard deviation of 8.2 percentage points. For other intervals, growth rates also varied 
considerably across industries, with standard deviations roughly as large or larger than the 
means. The standard deviation of growth rates across states within a given industry was 
approximately 4 percentage points over the entire sample period. The Data Appendix provides 
 Our sample 
of 18 industries accounted for 20 percent of the total number of manufacturing establishments, 
45 percent of total employment (wage earners), and 35 percent of total output and value added in 
1899. In 1929, these 18 industries accounted for 47 percent of the total number of manufacturing 
establishments, 54 percent of total employment (wage earners), 46 percent of total output, and 47 
percent of value added in 1929. Although it would be possible to expand the sample to include 
more industries, there are few additional industries for which data are available for many states. 
Focusing on industries that were present in a large number of states enables us to take full 
advantage of the cross-state variation in banking environments. 
                                                 
16 We started with the 20 largest industries in terms of employment in each year but were able to construct consistent 
definitions across time for only 18 industries. 10 
 
additional information about the industries that comprise our sample and the compilation of the 
data used in the econometric analysis.
17
Banking Market Concentration 
 
Table II provides summary statistics for new estimates of four-firm bank concentration 
ratios for U.S. states based on total deposits for 1899, 1909, 1919, and 1929, which we computed 
using data from Polk’s Bankers Encyclopedia.
18  For 1899, the four-firm concentration ratio 
ranges from 0.09 to 0.60, with a mean of 0.27. Mean (and median) concentration declined 
somewhat between 1899, 1909, and 1919 and then increased during the 1920s as the banking 
industry began to consolidate, especially in states that eased branching restrictions. Figure 1 
shows state banking concentrations in 1899 and 1929. The rankings of states by the level of 
concentration are highly correlated over time. However, changes in concentration across states 
varied considerably over the decades covered in our sample. The rank orderings of states in 
terms of changes in concentration are uncorrelated over time.
19
In estimating the impact of banking market concentration on output growth for 18 U.S. 
manufacturing industries, we use observations on concentration in the first year of the ten-year 
intervals over which we observe output growth. Although our observations on concentration 
precede (in time) those on output growth, it is conceivable that banking market concentration 
was determined to a significant degree by future growth of manufacturing industries. However, 
based on historical reasons and additional statistical tests we conducted, we are reasonably 
confident in treating lagged concentration as exogenous with respect to the growth rates of 
individual industries. We first examined the relationship between both levels and changes in 
concentration and lagged growth in manufacturing output and found that the two are 
uncorrelated. The correlation coefficients between state bank concentration in 1909, 1919, and 
 
                                                 
17 The motor vehicle parts and assembly industries are combined in the 1899 census. We use data for the combined 
industry throughout the sample period, and for automobile parts only for 1909-29. Data for some other sample 
industries are unavailable for some states in particular years. Across the 48 states, the number of industries with non-
missing (or non-zero) observations average 8.4, 9.9, and 10.4 for 1899-1909, 1909-19, and 1919-29, respectively. 
For our econometric analysis, we treat all cases of non-reported data as missing observations. See the Data 
Appendix for additional information.  
18 We constructed a four-firm commercial bank concentration ratio for each state based on total deposits using data 
for individual banks from Polk’s Bankers Encyclopedia (various years) and total deposits from Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System (1959). Our measure excludes data for mutual savings banks and other mutual 
savings institutions that generally made few commercial loans. 
19  The Spearman rank correlation coefficients for the levels of concentration in 1899, 1909, 1919, and 1929 range 
from 0.59 (for the correlation between ranks of 1899 and 1929) to 0.88 (for the correlation between ranks for 1909 
and 1919), and are all statistically significant at the one-percent level. The correlation coefficients for changes in 
concentration between 1899-09, 1909-19, and 1919-29 range from -0.17 to 0.17 and none is statistically significant. 11 
 
1929, and output growth during 1899-1909, 1909-19, and 1919-29, respectively are -0.05, -0.11, 
and 0.00. None is statistically significant. The correlation coefficient between state changes in 
concentration during 1909-19 with output growth during 1899-1909 is 0.20, and the correlation 
coefficient between changes in concentration during 1919-29 with output growth during 1909-19 
is 0.12. Neither is statistically significant (p-values of 0.17 and 0.43). In addition, using the 
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, we fail to reject the hypothesis that concentration is exogenous at 
standard confidence levels in regressions based on the three estimation equations in the text.  
These statistical results are consistent with the conclusions drawn from historical research 
finding that U.S. bank regulation and market structure in the 19th and early 20th centuries 
mainly reflected agricultural and other political interests outside of the manufacturing sector. 
That research also finds that U.S. bank regulation and market structure hampered American 
industrialization and did not begin to adjust significantly to the needs of an industrializing 
economy before the 1920s (one reason that the final observations on concentration in our 
analysis are for 1919). 
The importance of politics, and especially of the interests and influence of agriculture, is 
apparent in U.S. bank regulation and market structure in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. The United States twice rejected national banks with extensive interstate branch 
networks before the Civil War. Individual states established banking systems that best suited 
local interests which, in most states at the time, were dominated by agricultural interests. In most 
northern and midwestern states, land was the main form of wealth and collateral for bank loans 
for farmers. Those states tended to prohibit or severely restrict branch banking so as to ensure 
that banks would continue to lend to local farmers in bad times as well as good times (Calomiris, 
2000b). Northern farm states also imposed very low, or even no, minimum capital requirements 
on banks. As a result, those stated often had hundreds or thousands of small unit banks, high 
numbers of banks per capita, and low levels of state banking market concentration. 
Banking markets evolved somewhat differently in the antebellum South, but like northern 
farm states, they largely reflected the interests of agriculture. In contrast with the North, where a 
farmer’s wealth was predominantly in land, in antebellum southern plantation agriculture, slaves 
and cotton were the primary forms of collateral for loans. The mobility of such forms of wealth 
meant that southern plantation owners benefited less from tying banks to a particular locale by 
branching restrictions or other means (Calomiris, 2000b). Moreover, branch banks better served 12 
 
southern agriculture by reducing the cost of financing the movement of crops over long 
distances. Thus, southern states were more likely to allow some branch banking, have fewer 
banks per capita, and more concentrated banking markets.  
State banking regulations and market structures evolved slowly over the 19th and early 
20th centuries. Unit banking prevailed in most states after the Civil War and well into the 20th 
century. Although the National Banking Acts of the Civil War established a federal banking 
charter, and thus created the dual banking system, and interstate branching remained prohibited. 
Most states restricted the ability of banks to operate branch offices. Although few states allowed 
any branching at the end of the nineteenth century, several permitted at least limited branch 
banking by the 1920s. Some states permitted banks to establish branches only within their home-
office city or county, but a few, such as California, allowed statewide branching. The easing of 
restrictions on branching promoted consolidation in the banking industry during the 1920s via 
mergers and voluntary liquidations (Carlson and Mitchener, 2006; Wheelock, 1993; White, 
1985a).  
The public remained distrustful of large banks and the concentration of banking capital in 
general. Moreover, most bankers, especially the owners of small unit banks that predominated in 
rural areas, strongly opposed any moves to relax branching laws or raise minimum capital 
requirements. (State laws specified the minimum amount of paid-in capital required to receive a 
banking charter.) The unit banking lobby was especially strong in midwestern farm states, and 
effectively stalled moves to significantly ease restrictions on branching, either at the federal or 
state levels, even in states with a rapidly growing manufacturing sectors such as Illinois (White, 
1985b).  
Restrictions on branch banking and other regulations constrained the growth of U.S. 
banks and hampered their ability to serve larger firms or those with geographically-dispersed 
operations or customers. Those firms turned increasingly to the capital markets for investment 
funds. Although regulations that constrained the growth and geographical reach of U.S. banks 
encouraged the development of capital markets, American industrial firms appear to have faced 
higher financing costs than their counterparts in countries with banking systems dominated by 
large universal banks (Calomiris, 2000a).
20
                                                 
20 Keay and Redish (2004) show that throughout the twentieth century, large U.S. steel firms relied less on bank 
loans and other short-term debt and more on long-term debt issued on capital markets, than large Canadian firms, 
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industry, U.S. banking regulations and market structure continued to reflect the public’s long-
standing distrust of large banks and the political influence of agricultural interests well into the 
second half of the twentieth century. Hence, both the absence of correlation between bank 
concentration and lagged manufacturing output growth, and the political economy of nineteenth 
and early twentieth century bank regulation suggest that treating lagged  measures of the 
concentration of state banking markets as exogenous to the growth of manufacturing industries is 
a reasonable identifying assumption.  
Estimation Results 
The first column of Table III presents an estimate of Equation 1, where reported standard 
errors are clustered by state and industry.
21  As described above, the concentration variable 
captures the average effect of banking market concentration on industrial growth across our 
sample industries. The regression suggests that concentration had a positive and economically 
meaningful impact on growth  of  manufacturing  during  our sample period. Based on the 
coefficient estimate, an increase in concentration from the 25
th  to the 75
th  percentile of the 
distribution would result in a 1.5 percentage point increase in average annual manufacturing 
output growth. Our finding is broadly consistent with theoretical work by Petersen and Rajan 
(1995), who argue that market power in banking could allow newer firms or those without access 
to public capital markets to tap funds to finance new investment projects and grow more quickly 
(with the bank sharing in the future profit stream of the company through its monopoly rents). 
Our results are also consistent with Marquez (2002) who suggests that concentration in banking 
markets reduces inefficiencies associated with evaluating creditworthy borrowers. Our results 
differ from those of Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), however, who find in their cross-country 
study that, in general, more concentrated national banking markets retard industrial growth.
22
External Financial Reliance 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
which they argue reflected the differences in the banking market structures of the two countries. However, they find 
that on average the cost of capital for large steel firms was similar in the two countries. 
21 We experimented with clustering at the state-year level as well as just at the state level in order to address 
concerns about Moulton’s sampling problem and serial correlation. The reported results were not sensitive to these 
alternatives.  
22 We also estimated regressions of total state manufacturing output growth on state banking concentration, both 
with and without additional controls for branch banking and minimum capital regulations, the presence of a state 
deposit insurance system and the number of banks per capita, similar to the regressions reported in Dejia and Lleras-
Muney (2007). The coefficients on concentration in these regressions are positive and similar in size to those 
reported in Table III, though less precisely estimated due to the smaller sample size.  14 
 
As we noted in Section II, the impact of banking market structure on an industry’s growth 
may depend on industry-specific characteristics, such as the size of firms in the industry, their 
organizational form (e.g., corporations, partnerships, etc.), and other characteristics affecting 
how reliant firms in the industry are on financing expansion through retained earnings versus 
intermediated borrowing. For example, differences in industry-specific technology could affect 
the size of projects, the time it takes for projects to mature and produce returns, and the need for 
additional infusions of funds. Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that such industry-level 
characteristics can lead to differences across industries in dependence on external sources of 
financing. Differences in technology or financial market frictions could also lead to differences 
across industries in average firm size, organizational form, and in their relative reliance on banks 
for external financing. Thus, our next empirical specification allows for the possibility that the 
effect of bank concentration on growth varied across industries according to the extent of their 
reliance on external financing.  
Equation 2 includes external financial reliance as well as an interaction term between this 
variable and bank concentration to capture variation in the effects of concentration on growth 
across industries that differ in their reliance on external financing. 
(2)   %∆Outputijt = α1 + α2Bank Concentrationjt−1 
+ α3(External Financial Relianceit−1*Bank Concentrationjt−1)  
+ α4External Financial Relianceit−1 
+ α5Industry Share of Outputijt−1 
+ γj + λt + ξi + εijt. 
 
Because no measure can perfectly capture all dimensions by which firms in particular 
industries differ with respect to their financing needs, we consider four proxies to test whether 
our findings are sensitive to distinctive aspects of financial reliance that these measures capture. 
The first two measures are: (1) the average size of establishments (output per establishment) and 
(2) the percentage of establishments in an industry that were operated by incorporated firms. 
Differences in average firm size and incorporation rates across industries may reflect underlying 
technological differences affecting scale economies, dependence on external financing and 
dependence on banks, rather than financial markets, for external financing.
23
                                                 
23 Approximately 12.5 percent of all U.S. business units were incorporated in 1929, although the percentage was 
higher in manufacturing and, in general, much higher for large firms (more than 95 percent) than small firms 
(roughly 10 percent) (SEC, 1940, part I). We use observations on average establishment  size and percent 
incorporated from the first year of each 10-year period over which we observe output growth. Similar to Rajan and 
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problems are generally more acute with small firms, and thus small firms tend to face greater 
difficulties in obtaining external funding for positive net present value projects than large firms. 
Moreover, to the extent that they do tap outside sources of financing, small and unincorporated 
firms generally obtain a greater share of their funding from banks, which specialize in 
relationship lending, than from financial markets (Berger, 2010; Boot, 2000). Contemporary 
sources suggest that smaller and unincorporated firms typically had fewer years of established 
profitability, less-liquid assets, were tied more closely to local financial markets, and had credit 
needs that were less well suited to standard appraisal than large and incorporated firms (Jacoby 
and Saulnier, 1947). By contrast, larger firms and corporations were able to borrow on capital 
markets at lower cost than small firms (SEC, 1940, part II, Table 15) and typically issued more 
long-term debt than smaller or unincorporated firms (SEC, 1940, part II, Table 9). This suggests 
that larger firms or corporations probably also received better terms from banks and had greater 
access to outside funding sources than smaller and unincorporated firms. However, though small 
and unincorporated firms may have relied less on external financing in total, they may have been 
more sensitive to the structure of state banking markets than large and incorporated firms 
because they were more dependent on banks for external financing than large firms. Hence, the 
effect of banking concentration on growth rates across industries characterized by different size 
firms or incorporation rates is ultimately an empirical question. 
A third measure we consider is the par amount of outstanding bonds issued by an 
industry scaled by the value of output of that industry.
24
These three measures of external reliance vary over time, and do not assume that 
industry-specific technologies are constant. On the other hand, because these measures might 
 Similar to industries with larger firms 
and higher incorporation rates, industries with higher ratios of bonds to output likely relied more 
on external financing in general than other industries, but perhaps relatively less on banks 
specifically. Hence, industries with high ratios of bonds to output may have been less sensitive to 
the market structure or regulation of banks.  
                                                                                                                                                             
Zingales (1998), we created benchmark industry values for average firm size and percent incorporated using data for 
the United States as a whole rather than for individual states to minimize potential endogeneity. The main difference 
is that our data are from a single nation, so we use the national average rather than a single country as the 
benchmark. 
24 We use industry-level bond data from Hickman (1960) and output (value of product) data from the Census of 
Manufactures to construct this metric (Further details are described in the Data Appendix). As with our other 
measures, we use national-level data to construct bonds/output and observations are at 10-year intervals 
corresponding to 1899, 1909, and 1919 values. 16 
 
proxy for broader and somewhat less identifiable credit constraints than an accounting-based 
measure, we also employ Rajan and Zingales (1998) well-known, accounting-based measures of 
external financial dependence using data for the 1980s (since equivalent accounting data are 
unavailable during our sample period).
25 Our use of the Rajan-Zingales (RZ) measures assumes 
that industry-specific technologies determining relative dependence on external financing are 
constant across time within the United States whereas Rajan and Zingales (1998) assume that 
they are identical across countries.
26
While our four measures likely capture somewhat different aspects of industry-specific 
traits that relate to firms’ needs for external finance, or the sources of external finance they draw 
most heavily upon, the measures are nevertheless correlated with one another. Specifically, as 
shown in Table IV, average establishment size, percent incorporated, and the bonds-to-output 
ratio are strongly positively correlated with each other; percent incorporated is also positively 
correlated with the Rajan-Zingales measure of external financial dependence. Furthermore, as 
shown in Table IV, all four measures are negatively correlated with a measure of the share of 
bank credit in total firm liabilities in 1949, the first year for which such data are available 
(Goldsmith 1958, Table 63).
 
27
                                                 
25 Rajan and Zingales (1998) construct two measures of the extent to which firms in different industries depend on 
external sources of investment funding—one based on all firms and one based only on young firms (i.e., firms listed 
for less than 10 years) because young firms may be more dependent on external funds than mature firms. We present 
results for the all firms measure, but those using young firms are similar throughout.  
 This suggests further that larger firms, incorporated firms, and 
firms that had higher ratios of bonds to output, as well as firms that relied more heavily on 
external financing in general as reflected in the Rajan-Zingales measure, relied relatively less 
26 Neither assumption is ideal, though differences in legal systems, property rights, culture, etc. that might introduce 
problems of unobserved heterogeneity in cross-country studies, especially ones that include developing as well as 
developed countries, such as Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Cetorelli and Gambera (2001), are less likely to be 
important for our study of a single country. An underlying assumption in Rajan and Zingales (1998) is that cross-
country differences in industry growth rates reflect differences in financial development rather than differences in 
technologies or other conditions.  They base their  estimates of external dependence on the difference between 
investment and cash generated from operations for U.S. firms to investigate the impact of financial development on 
the growth rates of different industries in all countries. In their model, observed differences in reliance on external 
financing across U.S. industries reflect fundamental differences in technologies rather than distortions caused by 
underdeveloped capital markets or other frictions. Rajan and Zingales (1998) report dependence estimates for 
industrial groups defined by modern International Standard Industrial Classification groups. See the Data Appendix 
for the mapping of our 18 sample industries into these groups. For purposes of estimation, we normalize the RZ 
measures to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of unity. Although it would be possible to construct period-
based estimates of the Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure for some firms during our sample period, as in Giedeman 
(2005), the Rajan-Zingales measure requires balance sheet and income statement information that are available only 
for large publicly traded firms and would not be representative of most firms that comprise the industries in our data.  
27  The values for average establishment size, percent incorporated, and bonds/output used to calculate the 
correlations in Table III are averages of data for 1899, 1909 and 1919. 17 
 
heavily on banks for external financing than did other firms. Thus, our measures reflect both the 
extent of reliance on external financing as well as relative reliance on bank versus non-bank 
sources of external financing, and thereby provide a richer examination of how the structure of 
state banking markets affected industries with different characteristics. 
Given these definitions and assumptions, we can now test the hypothesis that 
characteristics of the banking sector had a greater impact on the growth of industries that rely 
more heavily on external financing and financing by banks. Columns 2-5 of Table III present 
estimates of Equation 2 where the four measures of industry-based reliance on external finance 
are interacted with the measure of banking market concentration. As was the case with our 
estimates of Equation 1, we find that bank concentration exerted an overall positive and 
statistically significant effect on manufacturing growth. The size of the effect is similar to the 
estimate for Equation 1, suggesting roughly a 1.5 percentage point increase in average annual 
manufacturing output growth when one moves from a state with a bank concentration ratio in the 
25
th percentile to one in the 75
th percentile. The coefficient on concentration interacted with 
reliance on external finance is negative in all four specifications, though statistically different 
from zero in only one of the four cases (using the bonds to output ratio). A negative sign 
suggests that firms that were more reliant on external financing, or with better access to capital 
markets, benefitted less from concentrated banking systems. The effect is especially pronounced 
for industries that relied heavily on the bond market, and thus less so on banks for external 
financing. Based on the coefficient on the interaction of concentration with the bonds-to-output 
ratio, an increase in concentration from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of the distribution would 
reduce the average growth rate of the steel industry, which had the highest average par value of 
bonds outstanding relative to output, by 1.25 percentage points. Hence, the net impact of such an 
increase in banking concentration on growth would range from an increase of 0.5 percentage 
points for the steel industry to 1.5 percentage points for the knits and women’s clothing 
industries, which had no bond financing.  
IV. Testing for the Effects of Unit Banking and Banking Policies 
Our initial specifications indicate that banking market concentration had a positive effect 
on manufacturing output growth in general, with weaker evidence that the impact varied across 
industries according to their reliance on external financing. This section explores whether 
additional features of state banking markets that may have influenced the competitiveness of 18 
 
those markets and the ability of firms to borrow from banks also affected industrial growth, and 
provides a robustness check on our initial findings. In addition to market concentration, in this 
section we estimate an empirical model that controls for differences in three state banking 
policies as well as the number of banks per capita, which helps to define how pervasive unit 
banking was in a particular state.  
Restrictions on entry may have influenced the provision of funds to firms, especially 
since lending is often localized (Petersen and Rajan, 2002; Bofondi and Gobbi, 2004; Lerner, 
1995). We therefore include two regulations that restricted entry as additional covariates: branch 
banking and minimum capital laws. Because the removal of branching restrictions in some states 
in the first part of the twentieth century unleashed competitive changes in state banking markets, 
we include the number of branch offices per commercial bank at the beginning of each decade as 
a covariate in our regressions.
28 Minimum capital requirements act as a barrier to entry, and thus 
may have influenced the growth rate of industries by limiting bank competition. We include each 
state’s minimum capital requirement as an additional covariate.
29
Deposit insurance is a third policy that affected the structure and competitiveness of state 
banking markets during the first decades of the twentieth century. Eight states established 
insurance systems to protect bank depositors in the years following the Panic of 1907. Insurance 
premiums were low and unrelated to failure risk, which appears to have encouraged entry and 
expanded bank lending initially, but at the expense of increased banking instability during the 
1920s (Alston, et al., 1994; Calomiris, 1992; Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2007; Wheelock, 
1992a, b). We include an indicator variable set equal to unity for states with an active deposit 
insurance system.
 Minimum capital requirements 
varied widely across states during our sample period. For example, in 1929, the minimum capital 
required to obtain a bank charter ranged from $10,000 in several states to $100,000 in 
Massachusetts.  
30
                                                 
28  Some studies examine the impact of branching using dummy variables indicating whether branching was 
permitted by law (e.g., Dehejia and Lleras-Muney, 2007). However, we use a continuous variable that captures the 
actual prevalence of branching within a state because branching was limited by custom or by bank supervisors in 
some states that did not prohibit branching by statute.  
 We also include the number of banks per capita to account for significant 
differences in unit banking and market structure across states. Researchers have suggested that 
29 Some states had several tiers of minimum charter capital based on the size of the municipality in which a bank 
was located. Here we use the state requirement for the smallest municipalities. 
30 The eight state deposit insurance systems were all established between 1908 and 1919. For purposes of estimation, 
we treat each state as having had a deposit insurance system in 1909 and 1919. 19 
 
the number of banks per capita reflects other aspects of the structure and competitiveness of 
banking markets, particularly in an environment of geographic restrictions and high 
transportation costs, which help explain the relative performance and stability of state and 
national banking systems.
31 Table V reports summary statistics for branch banking, minimum 
capital requirements, and banks per capita.
32
The four new covariates enter our estimation equation as direct influences on output 
growth and indirectly via interaction terms to test whether bank regulations had a differential 
effect on industries that relied more heavily on external financing in general, or on banks in 
particular for their external financing.
  
33
(3)   %∆Outputijt = α1 + α2Bank Concentrationjt−1 + α3External Relianceit−1 
 To the extent that regulations affect bank competition, 
banks’ incentives to take risks, their scale, etc., they could have different effects on the growth of 
industries that differ in terms of their dependence on banks for external financing. Our new 
estimation equation is as follows: 
+ α4(External Relianceit−1*Bank Concentrationjt−1) 
+ α5(Minimum Capitaljt−1) 
+ α6(External Relianceit−1*Minimum Capitaljt−1) 
+ α7(Deposit Insurancejt−1)  
+ α8(External Relianceit−1*Deposit Insurancejt−1) 
+ α9(Branch Banksit−1) 
+ α10(External Relianceit−1*Branch Banksjt−1) 
+ α11(Banks per Capitajt−1) 
+ α12(External Relianceit−1*Banks per Capitajt−1) 
+ α13Industry Share of Output in Manufacturingijt−1 
+ γj + λt + ξi + εijt. 
 
Table VI reports estimates of Equation 3. The results again indicate that banking market 
concentration exerted a positive influence on output growth in general (with the effect being 
similar in size to earlier regressions), even after accounting for differences in regulation across 
states. The positive coefficients on concentration are roughly equivalent or slightly larger than 
                                                 
31 For example, Rajan and Ramcharan (2009) find that a higher number of banks per capita increased the supply of 
credit across U.S. counties in the 1920s and 1930s but also contributed to higher bank failure rates during the Great 
Depression (see also Grossman, 2010; and Wheelock, 1993). 
32  Banks per capita and our four-bank concentration ratio are not strongly correlated; they have a correlation 
coefficient of −0.31 and hence capture somewhat different aspects of banking market structure. For our regressions 
we define banks per capita as the log of the number of commercial banks divided by state populations. 
33 As with our other independent variables, we observe data on the policy variables and banks per capita at the 
beginning of each 10-year period over which  we observe industry growth rates. The Data Appendix provides 
additional detail about these variables and data sources. 20 
 
those reported in Table III, again indicating that banking market concentration had generally a 
positive impact on industry growth rates. As in our earlier specifications, we find some evidence 
that the impact of concentration was somewhat less for industries with larger-size 
establishments, a higher percentage of incorporated establishments, higher bonds to output ratios, 
or greater dependence on external financing, as reflected in the Rajan-Zingales measure; 
however, only the coefficient on the interaction of concentration with the bonds/output measure 
is statistically significant (column 3). On balance, the results suggest that industries that relied 
more on capital markets for external financing benefited less from concentrated banking systems 
than did industries that relied more on banks for external financing. This seems consistent with 
the view that U.S. banking regulation and market structure encouraged the development of U.S. 
capital markets but may have hampered the growth of large-scale American enterprise (e.g., 
Calomiris, 2000a; Chandler, 1990; Davis, 1966; Giedeman, 2005). 
In three of the four regressions reported in Table VI, we find evidence that branch 
banking boosted the growth rate of industries that relied most heavily on external financing. 
Based on the coefficients reported in column 1 of Table VI, an increase in the prevalence of 
branching from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of the distribution would cause a change in average 
industry growth ranging from −0.3 percentage points for the marble and stone industry (the 
industry with the smallest average firm size) to +1.9 percentage points for the steel industry (the 
industry with the largest average firm size). We also find that a higher number of banks per 
capita boosted the growth of industries that relied more heavily on external financing. These 
results indicate that both more widespread branch banking and more banks per capita boosted 
economic growth, especially for industries that relied more heavily on external financing. They 
are also consistent with the view that relaxation of branching restrictions eased financing 
constraints by enabling banks to expand their geographical reach as well as their size, and that 
the effect was especially pronounced for industries with larger firms (Davis, 1966; Calomiris, 
2000a; Giedeman, 2005).
34
                                                 
34 When we included average bank size as an additional control variable the coefficients on banking concentration 
were not qualitatively different from those reported here. Results are available from the authors on request. 
  In addition, for given levels of concentration and branching, an 
increase in banks per capita appears to have spurred growth, perhaps by increasing the supply of 
credit (Rajan and Ramcharan, 2009), which again benefited industries that relied relatively more 
on external financing.  21 
 
Deposit insurance is another policy that appears to have affected the growth of 
manufacturing output. The coefficient estimate reported in Column (1) indicates that the 
presence of a state deposit insurance system reduced average annual manufacturing sector 
growth by approximately 4 percentage points. We find no evidence that the impact of deposit 
insurance varied according to an industry’s reliance on external financing. As noted previously, 
several studies have found that deposit insurance contributed to instability in state banking 
markets during the 1910s and 1920s. Our results suggest that this instability had a detrimental 
impact on growth in the manufacturing sector in the states that established insurance systems.
35
V. Alternative Specifications and Robustness Checks 
 
Further evidence of the  effects  of banking market structure and regulation on U.S. 
manufacturing output growth is presented in Tables VII and VIII. First, we test whether the 
impact of bank concentration differed in the South than in the rest of the United States. We 
include  a dummy variable for southern states interacted with concentration in specifications 
similar to those reported in Table VI. As shown in Table VII, the coefficient on the South 
intercept dummy is positive and statistically significant, indicating that, in general, 
manufacturing industries grew faster in southern states than in the rest of the country. The 
coefficient on the interaction of the South dummy with concentration is negative and fairly large, 
suggesting that bank market concentration had a weaker impact on growth in the South. 
However, the coefficient on the interaction term is not statistically significant and, thus, we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that the impact of concentration was similar in the South as in the 
rest of the country.
36
Next, we explore further whether the impact of banking market concentration differed 
across industries. Rather than specifying a model with interaction terms to test for differences 
across industries, we instead estimated separate regressions for groups of industries characterized 
by either low or high average establishment size, percent of incorporated establishments, levels 
of bonds outstanding to total output, or Rajan-Zingales’ measure of dependence on external 
  
                                                 
35  Dehejia and Lleras-Muney (2007) find that deposit insurance had a positive impact on bank loan growth and 
manufacturing value added before 1920 and a negative impact after 1920, though the effects on loan growth and 
value added before 1920 are not statistically significant in a model that includes other time-varying controls. We 
replaced the deposit insurance variable in Equation 3 with separate variables to test whether the impact of deposit 
insurance on output growth differed between the decades of the 1910s and 1920s. We were unable to reject the 
hypothesis that the coefficients on the deposit insurance variables for the two decades are equal. 
36  We found similar results in regressions that exclude the policy variables and banks per capita. Results are 





 Table VIII reports estimation results for industries in the lowest and highest one-
third of industries for each characteristic. The estimates indicate that bank market concentration 
had a larger impact on industries characterized by smaller average size establishments and low 
incorporation rates. Such industries would generally be more dependent on banks for external 
financing and, hence, affected by the structure and regulation of banking markets. However, we 
find no significant differences in the effect of banking concentration between industries grouped 
by either bonds/output or the Rajan-Zingales measure. 
The first three decades of the twentieth century witnessed both rapid growth of the U.S. 
manufacturing sector and numerous changes in state banking policies and market structures. Our 
research finds that banking market concentration generally exerted a positive influence on the 
growth of U.S. manufacturing industries in this period. This result appears robust to alternative 
measures of growth, reliance on external and bank finance, and to the inclusion of additional 
characteristics of banking market structure and policy, which differed significantly across states. 
We also find some evidence that the impact of banking market concentration on growth 
was smaller for industries with larger firms, higher percentages of incorporated firms, and firms 
that relied relatively heavily on bond markets for external funding. Industries with smaller firms 
or less (or more costly) access to capital markets relied relatively more on banks for external 
financing and thus were more directly affected by the concentration of banking markets. 
Industries with larger amounts of bond financing, by contrast, benefited less from banking 
concentration.  
In addition, we find evidence that other banking system characteristics affected economic 
growth. For a given level of concentration, both higher numbers of banks per capita and more 
branch banking boosted output growth among industries whose firms relied relatively heavily on 
external financing or tended to have larger establishments (or, in the case of banks per capita, a 
higher percentage of  incorporated firms). Thus, our results are consistent with Rajan and 
Ramcharan (2009), who find that an increase in the number of banks per capita increases the 
supply of credit in local banking markets, as well as with the many studies finding that the 
                                                 
37 We constructed “high” and “low” groups for each dependence measure. For average establishment size and 
percent of establishments in incorporated firms, groupings include the six industries with the highest (lowest) values 
of the financial dependence measure for 1899, 1909, and 1919. In the case of bonds/output, however, we included 
nine industries in the “low” group for 1899 because none had outstanding bonds in that year.  23 
 
removal of state restrictions on branching in the 1980s and 1990s increased credit supply and 
boosted economic growth (e.g., Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996). Our study also suggests that 
deposit insurance may have retarded the growth of manufacturing output in general, a finding 
consistent with prior research showing that deposit insurance contributed to instability in state 
banking systems.  
Our research thus contributes to a growing literature demonstrating that the structure and 
regulation of banking markets  can affect economic growth. In particular, we find that the 
relationship between the concentration of national banking markets and industrial growth in 
countries whose banking systems are dominated by large banks with nationwide branch networks 
does not reflect the U.S. experience of unit banking. Although the removal of legal barriers to 
branching in the 1980s and 1990s promoted consolidation within the U.S. banking industry and 
the integration of formerly distant banking markets, the evidence presented here illustrates how 
the institutions that determine the competitive landscape of banking markets can affect economic 
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Table I: Annualized Growth Rate of Inflation-Adjusted Output for Sample 
Industries 
 
Industry    1899 to 1909  1909 to 1919  1919 to 1929  1899 to 1929 
Cotton    4.43%  5.76%  -2.72%  2.49% 
Lumber    2.45%  -0.81%  -0.14%  0.50% 
Iron/Steel    3.28%  3.93%  2.11%  3.10% 
Cars, general repair, 
steam railroad    4.47%  4.87%  -0.40%  2.98% 
Electric Machinery    7.00%  8.44%  8.73%  8.06% 
Motor Vehicle 
Assembly    37.87%  18.53%  5.73%  20.71% 
Auto Parts      18.64%  8.36%   
Knit Goods    5.63%  6.09%  2.70%  4.80% 
Boots and Shoes    3.96%  3.28%  -1.38%  1.95% 
Baking    6.43%  4.04%  3.19%  4.55% 
Furniture    3.89%  2.52%  7.01%  4.47% 
Women's Clothes    7.08%  4.83%  3.84%  5.25% 
Printing and Publishing   4.51%  1.74%  6.15%  4.13% 
Silk/Rayon Goods    4.34%  5.90%  0.97%  3.74% 
Meatpacking    3.68%  4.80%  -1.75%  2.25% 
Tobacco    2.84%  2.27%  2.44%  2.52% 
Woolen Goods    3.59%  3.52%  -2.61%  1.50% 
Marble/Stone      4.10%  -1.67%  4.04%  2.15% 
Mean    6.44%  5.37%  2.57%  4.42% 
Standard Deviation    8.21  5.37  3.65  4.55 
 
           
Sources:  Thirteenth Census of the United States, Manufacturers, Volume IX (1899-
1909); Fourteenth Census of the United States, Manufacturers, Volume IX and X 
(1919); Fifteenth Census of the United States, Manufacturers, Volume II (1929). 
           
            
 
        Table II: Commercial Bank Four-Firm Concentration Ratio 
 
Level of Bank Concentration 
    1899  1909  1919  1929   
  Mean  0.2673  0.2244  0.2063  0.2912   
  Median  0.2084  0.2057  0.1811  0.2629   
  Min  0.0908  0.0624  0.0620  0.0861   
  Max  0.6028  0.7267  0.6976  0.8190   
  Std Dev  0.1420  0.1222  0.1205  0.1502   
             
Changes in Bank Concentration 
    1899-1909  1909-1919  1919-1929   
  Mean  -0.0429  -0.0181  0.0850   
  Median  -0.0397  -0.0083  0.0701   
  Min  -0.2837  -0.1616  -0.1016   
  Max  0.1818  0.1087  0.2996   
  Std Dev  0.08  0.05  0.09   
 
Source:  Polk’s Bankers Encyclopedia (various issues) for data on deposits for individual banks; 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1959) for data on deposits for states.    
Table III: The Effects of Bank Concentration on Output Growth Across Manufacturing Industries 
           
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
           
Bank Concentration  0.1204**  0.1218**  0.1607***  0.1361***  0.1195** 
  (0.0493)  (0.0502)  (0.0511)  (0.0511)  (0.0490) 
           
Bank Concentration x External Reliance    -0.0082  -0.0663  -0.3807**  -0.0146 
    (0.0353)  (0.0413)  (0.1729)  (0.0141) 
           
External Reliance    0.0016  0.0722***  0.063   
    (0.0186)  (0.0182)  (0.0459)   
           
Industry Share of Output  -0.0277  -0.0282  -0.0153  -0.0274  -0.027 
  (0.0210)  (0.0212)  (0.0189)  (0.0211)  (0.0209) 
           
R
2  0.3714  0.3714  0.3608  0.3736  0.3719 
Number of Observations  1378  1378  1368  1378  1378 
           
Notes: The regression in column (1) corresponds to Equation 1 in the text; those in Columns (2) to (5) correspond to 
Equation 2. The measures of external reliance used to produce the results in columns (2)-(5) are, respectively, 
average establishment size, percentage of establishments incorporated, bonds outstanding divided by total output, and 
the Rajan-Zingales measure of external dependence for all firms. All regressions include a constant term and state, 
industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by state and industry. 
*  indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** significance at the 5 percent level, *** significance at the 1  
percent level  
  
Table IV. Correlations Among Measures of Reliance on External Finance and Bank Credit 
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Notes: This table reports correlations and associated p-values (in parentheses) among alternative 
measures of reliance on external finance and bank credit. Values for average firm size, percent 
incorporated, and bonds/output are averages of data for 1899, 1909, and 1919. Rajan-Zingales 
refers to the Rajan-Zingales (1998) measure of external financial dependence for all firms.  
 
Sources: Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Censuses of the United States, Manufacturers 
(average establishment size, percent incorporated and output); Hickman (1960, Table 44) (par 
value of bonds outstanding); Goldsmith (1958, Table 63) (bank credit share in 1949). 
  
Table V: Summary Statistics for Minimum Capital 
Requirements, Branch Banking, and Number of 
Banks per Capita 
         
Minimum Capital Requirements ($000s) 
  1899  1909  1919  1929 
Mean  19.27  18.23  19.00  22.19 
Median  15.00  10.00  15.00  25.00 
Min  0.00  0.00  2.00  10.00 
Max  100.00  100.00  100.00  100.00 
Std. Dev.  18.16  15.77  16.13  14.40 
         
Branch Banking (branches per bank) 
  1899  1909  1919  1929 
Mean  0.02  0.04  0.07  0.20 
Median  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.01 
Min  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Max  0.13  0.32  0.42  2.00 
Std. Dev.  0.04  0.07  0.11  0.38 
         
Number of Banks per Capita (banks per 1000 persons) 
  1899  1909  1919  1929 
Mean  0.18  0.32  0.36  0.23 
Median  0.16  0.25  0.27  0.19 
Min  0.06  0.04  0.04  0.03 
Max  0.51  1.16  1.39  0.58 
Std. Dev.  0.12  0.23  0.28  0.14 
 
Notes: Minimum Capital Requirements refers to the minimum dollar amount of paid-in capital 
required to obtain a bank charter in the smallest municipality in a given state in a given year. 
Branch Banking is the ratio of the total number of bank branch offices to total commercial banks. 
Banks per capita is the number of commercial banks per 1000 persons.  
 
Sources: White (1983, Table 1.3) (minimum capital requirements, 1899-1909); Polk’s Bankers 
Encyclopedia (minimum capital requirements, 1919); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (1943, Table 74) (branch banking laws); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System (1959) (number of banks). 
Table VI: The Effects of Bank Concentration and Banking Policy on Output Growth 
         
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Bank Concentration  0.1423***  0.1686***  0.1559***  0.1380*** 
  (0.0518)  (0.0556)  (0.0530)  (0.0509) 
         
Bank Concentration x External Reliance  -0.0307  -0.053  -0.6130***  0.0012 
  (0.0400)  (0.0417)  (0.1961)  (0.0168) 
         
Minimum Capital Requirement  -0.0935  -0.0785  -0.1216  -0.0861 
  (0.2865)  (0.2749)  (0.2879)  (0.2810) 
         
Minimum Capital x External Reliance  0.0875  -0.0513  1.1639  0.038 
  (0.2096)  (0.2408)  (0.7411)  (0.0850) 
         
Branch Banking  -0.0630*  -0.0716*  -0.0489  -0.024 
  (0.0362)  (0.0398)  (0.0360)  (0.0362) 
         
Branch Banking x External Reliance  0.1799***  0.1018  1.1527***  0.0417* 
  (0.0539)  (0.0640)  (0.4107)  (0.0253) 
         
Deposit Insurance  -0.0426***  -0.0497***  -0.0381***  -0.0415*** 
  (0.0107)  (0.0127)  (0.0100)  (0.0093) 
         
Deposit Insurance x External Reliance  -0.0133  0.0069  -0.1593**  0.0135 
  (0.0108)  (0.0161)  (0.0773)  (0.0094) 
         
Banks Per Capita  0.2561  -0.3272  0.5134  0.9515 
  (0.8272)  (0.8748)  (0.8357)  (0.8224) 
         
Banks Per Capita x External Reliance  3.1002***  2.1061***  12.6710***  1.4853*** 
  (0.7316)  (0.7337)  (3.9277)  (0.4048) 
         
External Reliance  0.0079  0.0922***  0.2677***   
  (0.0185)  (0.0211)  (0.0730)   
         
Industry Share of Output  -0.032  -0.0147  -0.024  -0.031 
  (0.0225)  (0.0188)  (0.0203)  (0.0204) 
         
R
2  0.3874  0.3753  0.3875  0.3979 
Number of Observations  1378  1368  1378  1378 
         
Notes: The regressions in columns (1)-(4) correspond to Equation 3 in the text. The measures of external reliance used to 
produce the results in columns (1)-(4) are, respectively, average establishment size, percentage of establishments incorporated, 
bonds outstanding divided by total output, and the Rajan-Zingales measure of external dependence for all firms. All 
regressions include a constant term and state, industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by 
state and industry. *  indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** significance at the 5 percent level, *** significance at 




Table VII :  Output Growth Regressions: Was the South Different? 
         
Independent Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Bank Concentration   0.1519***  0.1778***  0.1651***  0.1471*** 
  (0.0532)  (0.0571)  (0.0544)  (0.0523) 
         
Bank Concentration x External Reliance  -0.0291  -0.0525  -0.6142***  0.0009 
  (0.0397)  (0.0417)  (0.1961)  (0.0168) 
         
Minimum Capital Requirement  -0.061  -0.047  -0.0902  -0.0547 
  (0.2882)  (0.2755)  (0.2896)  (0.2828) 
         
Minimum Capital x External Reliance  0.0929  -0.0481  1.162  0.0386 
  (0.2106)  (0.2409)  (0.7406)  (0.0851) 
         
Branch Banking  -0.0641*  -0.0723*  -0.0498  -0.0249 
  (0.0363)  (0.0399)  (0.0361)  (0.0362) 
         
Branch Banking x External Reliance  0.1804***  0.1013  1.1524***  0.0419* 
  (0.0542)  (0.0642)  (0.4106)  (0.0253) 
         
Deposit Insurance  -0.0422***  -0.0491***  -0.0378***  -0.0412*** 
  (0.0107)  (0.0126)  (0.0100)  (0.0093) 
         
Deposit Insurance x External Reliance  -0.0135  0.0063  -0.1594**  0.0133 
  (0.0108)  (0.0161)  (0.0773)  (0.0094) 
         
Banks Per Capita  0.1153  -0.4699  0.3853  0.8264 
  (0.8345)  (0.8795)  (0.8463)  (0.8329) 
         
Banks Per Capita x External Reliance  3.1377***  2.1443***  12.7456***  1.4943*** 
  (0.7312)  (0.7261)  (3.9310)  (0.4037) 
         
External Reliance  0.0077  0.0929***  0.2690***   
  (0.0184)  (0.0210)  (0.0730)   
         
Industry Share of Output  -0.032  -0.0148  -0.024  -0.031 
  (0.0225)  (0.0188)  (0.0203)  (0.0204) 
         
South Region  0.0697***  0.0726***  0.0704***  0.0709*** 
  (0.0268)  (0.0270)  (0.0265)  (0.0266) 
         
South Region x Bank Concentration  -0.1149  -0.1108  -0.1077  -0.1075 
  (0.1036)  (0.1010)  (0.1039)  (0.1017) 
         
R
2  0.3879  0.3758  0.388  0.3984 
Number of Observations  1378  1368  1378  1378 
         
Notes: The regressions in columns (1)-(4) correspond to Equation 3 in the text. The measures of external 
reliance used to produce the results in columns (1)-(4) are, respectively, average establishment size, percentage 
of establishments incorporated, bonds outstanding divided by total output, and the Rajan-Zingales measure of 
external dependence for all firms. All regressions include a constant term and state, industry and year fixed 
effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by state and industry. 
*  indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** significance at the 5 percent level, *** significance at the 1 
percent level  
 
Table VIII: Output Growth Regressions for Industry Groups 
     














R-Z All Firms 
                 
Bank Concentration   0.2001***  0.2027***  0.0954  0.1535  0.075  0.1160**  0.0726  0.162 
  (0.0617)  (0.0613)  (0.0892)  (0.1587)  (0.0673)  (0.0563)  (0.0558)  (0.2204) 
                 
Minimum Capital 
Requirements  -0.392  -0.2418  0.3069  0.518  0.1071  -0.2427  0.0104  -0.7258 
  (0.2486)  (0.2694)  (0.5926)  (0.6665)  (0.3794)  (0.3834)  (0.3572)  (0.7642) 
                 
Branch Banking  -0.0182  -0.0335  -0.0656  -0.0218  0.0655  -0.0268  0.0437  -0.0787 
  (0.0425)  (0.0462)  (0.0609)  (0.0837)  (0.0803)  (0.0769)  (0.0666)  (0.1519) 
                 
Deposit Insurance   -0.0507***  -0.0451***  -0.0173  -0.0571**  -0.0358***  -0.0274**  -0.0451***  -0.0157 
  (0.0121)  (0.0130)  (0.0145)  (0.0229)  (0.0125)  (0.0137)  (0.0160)  (0.0265) 
                 
Banks Per Capita  0.5271  -0.2116  1.1307  -0.3147  1.6214  -0.692  1.4371  3.6232 
  (0.9607)  (1.0014)  (1.3535)  (1.5242)  (1.6661)  (1.4669)  (1.4979)  (2.7484) 
                 
Industry Share of Output  0.0538*  0.0324  -0.1641***  0.0552  -0.0322  0.0307  0.0435  -0.1292 
  (0.0301)  (0.0298)  (0.0476)  (0.0651)  (0.0268)  (0.0322)  (0.0394)  (0.1199) 
                 
                 
R-Squared  0.4933  0.512  0.4135  0.3625  0.5095  0.5253  0.5019  0.5572 
Number of Observations  687  649  495  438  388  395  428  232 
                 
Notes: The regressions in each column were run on a sample of a select group of industries that were in the lowest or highest third of dependence in each cross-sectional period. 
All regressions include a constant term and state, industry and year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered by state and industry. 
*  indicates significance at the 10 percent level, ** significance at the 5 percent level, *** significance at the 1 percent level  
Data Appendix 
 
Census of Manufacturers 
 
State-level data on output, value added, employment and number of establishments for various 
industries are from the Censuses of Manufacturers for 1899, 1909, 1919, and 1929. We identified 
the 20 largest industries in terms of employment for the United States as a whole in both 1899 
and 1929 from the Census of Manufacturers for 1929, Vol. 2, Table 6, p. 34. We subsequently 
determined that we could obtain reasonably consistent state-level data for 1899, 1909, 1919, and 
1929 for the following 18 industries or industry groups:   
 
1.  Cotton goods (including “cotton small wares”) 
2.  Lumber and timber products (including “planning mill products” and “boxes-wooden 
packing”) 
3.  Iron and steel works and mills 
4.  Cars, general construction and repair, steam railroad 
5.  Electrical machinery (apparatus and supplies) 
6.  Motor vehicles and motor vehicle bodies and parts 
7.  Motor vehicle bodies and parts only 
8.  Knit goods 
9.  Boots and shoes (including “cut stock” and “findings”) 
10.  Bread and bakeries 
11.  Furniture (including refrigerators) 
12.  Clothing, women’s 
13.  Printing and publishing (including book and job, newspaper, music publishing, bookbinding, 
engraving-steel and copperplate, and lithography) 
14.  Silk and rayon 
15.  Meat packing (including “sausage not prepared in slaughtering or meat-packing 
establishments”) 
16.  Tobacco products (including cigars and cigarettes and other tobacco products). 
17.  Woolen manufacturers (including woolen goods, worsted goods, carpets and rugs (other than 
rag), felt goods, and wool hats). 
18.  Masonry, brick and stone (including brick and tile, marble, granite, slate and other stone 
products and stone work, and clay products) 
 
State-level data for 1919 and 1929 aggregated across all industries, and U.S. aggregated data for 
individual industries are from the Census of Manufacturers for 1929, Volume 2.  We adjusted the 
data reported for 1919 to exclude data for automobile repair shops, which are not included in the 
published data for 1899, 1909 or 1929.  State-level data for 1899 and 1909 aggregated across all 
industries, and U.S. aggregated data for individual industries, are from the Census of 
Manufacturers for 1919, Volume 8, Tables 48 and 49.   
 
Reliance on External Financing 
 
Average size of establishments: Data on total output (value of produce) and number of 
establishments for 1899, 1909, and 1919 by industry from various volumes of the Census of 
Manufacturing.  
  
Percentage of establishments operated by incorporated firms: Data for 1899, 1909, and 1919 by 
industry from various volumes of the Census of Manufacturing. 
 
Bonds outstanding divided by total output: Data on the par value of bonds outstanding by 
industry from Hickman (1960), Table 44. Data on total output (value of product) by industry are 
from the Census of Manufacturing. The following table shows our mapping of the industrial 
groups reported in Hickman (1960) to the groups represented in our data. 
 
Hickman Industry      Corresponding Sample Industry 
textiles         cotton goods 
lumber/timber products    lumber/timber products 
iron/steel        iron/steel 
transportation equipment    railroad cars 
electrical machinery      electrical machinery 
autos          motor vehicles and parts 
apparel         knit goods 
leather         boots/shoes 
food          bread/bakeries 
furniture        furniture 
apparel         clothing, womens 
printing/publishing      printing/publishing 
textiles         silk/rayon 
food          meat packing 
tobacco        tobacco 
textiles         woolen mfg. 
stone/clay/glass      masory/brick/stone   
 
Rajan and Zingales (1998) measure: We use the “all companies” and “young firms” measures of 
external dependence reported in Rajan and Zingales (1998) for different industrial groups.  The 
following table shows our mapping of the industrial groups reported in Rajan and Zingales 
(1998) to the groups represented in our data. 
 
Rajan-Zingales Industry    Corresponding Sample Industry 
textiles         cotton goods                     
wood products       lumber/timber products           
iron/steel                     iron/steel 
transportation equipment    railroad cars                    
electrical machinery                 electrical machinery 
motor vehicles                         motor vehicles 
apparel         knit goods                       
footwear         boots/shoes                      
food products        bread/bakeries                   
furniture                          furniture 
apparel         women’s clothing              
printing/publishing                  printing publishing 
textiles         silk/rayon and woolen goods                     
food products        meat packing                     
tobacco                        tobacco 





Concentration:  For each state, we constructed ratios of the deposits in the four largest 
commercial banks to deposits in all commercial banks for 1900, 1910, and1919 using data in 
Polk’s Bankers Encyclopedia. Total deposits in all banks and all commercial banks are from All 
Bank Statistics, 1896-1955 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1959).   
 
Regulations:   
 
Branch banking restrictions:  For each state, we computed the ratio of bank branches to total 
banks (total commercial banks) and the ratio of branches outside the head-office city to total 
banks (commercial banks) in 1900, 1910, and 1920.  Source:  Banking and Monetary Statistics, 
1914-1941 (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 1943, Table 74). 
 
Deposit insurance:  The following states operated a deposit insurance system (year operation 
began):  Kansas (1909), Mississippi (1914), Nebraska (1911), North Dakota (1917), Oklahoma 
(1908), South Dakota (1916), Texas (1910), and Washington (1917).  All of these systems 
collapsed during the early 1920s.  Source:  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual 
Report for 1956.   
 
Minimum capital requirement for state chartered banks:  smallest dollar amount of capital 
required to charter a bank.  The source of these data are White (1983, Table 1.3) for 1899 and 
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